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Abstract
We revisit a classic coordination problem from the perspective of mechanism design: how
can we coordinate a social welfare maximizing flow in a network congestion game with selfish
players? The classical approach, which computes tolls as a function of known demands, fails
when the demands are unknown to the mechanism designer, and naively eliciting them does not
necessarily yield a truthful mechanism. Instead, we introduce a weak mediator that can provide
suggested routes to players and set tolls as a function of reported demands. However, players
can choose to ignore or misreport their type to this mediator. Using techniques from differential
privacy, we show how to design a weak mediator such that it is an asymptotic ex-post Nash
equilibrium for all players to truthfully report their types to the mediator and faithfully follow
its suggestion, and that when they do, they end up playing a nearly optimal flow. Notably, our
solution works in settings of incomplete information even in the absence of a prior distribution on
player types. Along the way, we develop new techniques for privately solving convex programs
which may be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
Large, atomic traffic routing games model the common scenario in which n agents (say, residents
of a city) must choose paths in some graph (the road network) to route a unit of flow (drive to
work) between their target source/sink pairs. In aggregate, the decisions of each of these agents
cause congestion on the edges (traffic), and each agent experiences a cost equal to the sum of the
latencies of the edges she traverses, given the decisions of everyone else. The latencies on each edge
are a function of the congestion on that edge.
This widely studied class of games presents several well known challenges:
1. First, for the social welfare objective, the price of anarchy is unboundedly large when the
latencies can be arbitrary convex functions.
2. Second, in atomic routing games, equilibria are not unique, and hence equilibrium selection
is an important problem.
3. Finally, as in most large games, players will be generally unaware of the types of their oppo-
nents, and so it is important to understand these games in settings of incomplete information.
One way to address the first challenge is to introduce carefully selected tolls on the edges,
which modifies the game and decreases the price of anarchy. Indeed, so called marginal cost tolls
make the socially optimal routing a Nash equilibrium. The marginal cost toll on each edge charges
each agent the cost that she imposes on all other agents. However, in atomic congestion games
with marginal cost tolls, the socially optimal routing is not necessarily the only Nash equilibrium
routing, and so the price of anarchy can be larger than 1, and the coordination problem is still not
solved. Moreover, because it is difficult to charge agents tolls as a function of what others are doing
(as the marginal cost tolls do), there is a large literature that considers the problem of finding fixed
tolls that induce the optimal routing, under various conditions Cole et al. (2003); Fleischer et al.
(2004); Karakostas and Kolliopoulos (2004); Fleischer (2005); Swamy (2007); Fotakis et al. (2010)
This literature, however, assumes the agents’ source/sink pairs are known, and computes the
tolls as a function of this information. In this paper we instead take a mechanism design approach—
the demands of the agents must be elicited, and agents may misrepresent their demands if it
is advantageous to do so. Compared to standard mechanism design settings, our mechanism is
somewhat restricted: it can only set anonymous tolls, and cannot require direct payments from
the agents, and it also cannot force the agents to take any particular route. Because of these
limitations, standard tools like the VCG mechanism do not apply. Instead, we approach the problem
by introducing a weak mediator which also solves the 2nd and 3rd problems identified above—it
solves the equilibrium selection problem, even in settings of incomplete information. The solutions
we give are all approximate (both in terms of the incentives we guarantee, and our approximation
to the optimal social welfare), but the solution approaches perfect as the game grows large.
Informally, a weak mediator is an intermediary with whom agents can choose to interact with.
This leads to a new mediated game, related to the original routing game. In our setting, the weak
mediator elicits the types of each agent. Based on the agents reports, it fixes constant tolls to
charge on each edge, and then suggests a route for each agent to play. However, agents are free
to act independently of the mediator. They need not report their type to it honestly, or even
report a type at all. They are also not obligated to follow the route suggested by the mediator,
and can deviate from it in arbitrary ways. Our goal is to design a mediator that incentivizes “good
behavior” in the mediated game—that agents should truthfully report their type to the mediator,
and then faithfully follow its suggestion. Moreover, we want that when agents do this, the resulting
routing will be socially optimal.
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Our main result is that this is possible in large routing games with convex loss functions. By
large, we mean both that the number of players n is large, and that the latency functions are
Lipschitz continuous—i.e. that no single agent can substantially affect the latency of any edge via a
unilateral deviation. We give a weak mediator that makes “good behavior” an approximate ex-post
Nash equilibrium—i.e. a Nash equilibrium in every game that might be induced by realizations
of the agents types. This is an extremely robust solution concept that applies even when agents
have no distributional knowledge of each other’s types. In the limit as n goes to infinity, the
approximate equilibrium becomes exact. The mediator also implements an approximately optimal
routing, in that the welfare of the suggested routing is suboptimal by an additive term that is
sublinear in n. Hence, if the cost of the optimal routing grows linearly, or nearly linearly in n, then
the approximately optimal flow achieves a fraction of the optimal social welfare that is arbitrarily
close to 1.
1.1 Our Techniques and Main Results
At a high level, the approach we take is to design a mediator which takes as input the reported
source/destination pairs of each agent, and as a function of those reports:
1. Computes the optimal routing given the reported demands, and
2. Computes fixed tolls that make this routing a Nash equilibrium, and finally
3. Suggests to each player that they play their part of this optimal routing.
However, implementing each of these steps straightforwardly does not make good behavior an
equilibrium in general. Agents may hope to gain in two ways by misreporting their type: they
may hope to change the tolls charged on the path that they eventually take, and they may hope
to change the algorithm’s suggestions to other players, to change the edge congestions. Simply
because the game is large, and hence each player has little direct effect on the costs of other players
does not necessarily mean that no player’s report can have large effect on an algorithm which is
computing an equilibrium (see e.g. Kearns et al. (2014) for an example).
To address this problem, we follow the approach taken in Kearns et al. (2014); Rogers and Roth
(2014) and compute the optimal routing and tolls using joint differential privacy. Informally, joint
differential privacy guarantees that if any agent unilaterally misreports her demand, then it has
only a small effect on the routes taken by every other agent, as well as on the tolls. (It of course
has a very large effect on the route suggested to that agent herself, since she is always given a
route between her reported source/sink pairs!) As we show, this is sufficient to guarantee that
an agent cannot benefit substantially by misreporting her demand. Assuming the other agents
behave honestly—meaning they report their true demand and follow their suggested route—then
the fact that the algorithm also is guaranteed to compute a routing which forms an approximate
equilibrium of the game, given the tolls, guarantees that agents cannot do substantially better than
also playing honestly, and playing their part of the computed equilibrium.
In order to do this, we need to develop new techniques for convex optimization under joint
differential privacy. In particular, in order to find the socially optimal flow privately, we need the
ability to privately solve a convex program with an objective that is not linearly separable among
players, and hence one for which existing techniques Hsu et al. (2014b) do not apply.
We now informally state the main theorem of this paper. It asserts that there is a mediator that
incentivizes good behavior as an ex-post Nash equilibrium, while implementing the optimal flow.
Here we assume that the latency functions on the edges are bounded by the number of players n
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and are Lipschitz continuousalthough our formal theorem statement gives more general parameter
tradeoffs.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For large1 routing games with n players and m edges, there exists a
mediator M such that good behavior is an ηeq-approximate Nash equilibrium in the mediated game
where
ηeq = O˜
(
m3/2n4/5
)
and when players follow good behavior, the resulting flow is an ηopt-approximately optimal average
flow for the original routing game where
ηopt = O˜
(
mn4/5
)
.
To interpret this theorem, let us write OPT to denote the average player latency in the socially
optimal flow. Note that in this parameter regime (latency functions which are bounded by n and
Lipschitz), if the value OPT increases at a rate faster than n4/5 as the population n grows, then
our mediator yields a flow that obtains average latency (1 + on(1)) ·OPT.2 We view this condition
on OPT as very mild. For example, if the network is fixed and all of the latency functions have
derivatives bounded strictly away from zero, then the optimal average latency will grow at a rate of
Ω(n). Our results hold even when the optimal average latency grows sublinearly. Similarly, in this
setting, for a 1 − on(1) fraction of individuals the latency of their best response route also grows
at a rate of Ω(n), and hence our mediator guarantees that for a (1− on(1))-fraction of individuals,
they are playing an (1− on(1))-approximate best-response (i.e. they cannot decrease their latency
by more than a 1− on(1) multiplicative factor by deviating from the mediator’s suggestion).
1.2 Related Work
There is a long history of using tolls to modify the equilibria in congestion games (see e.g. Beckmann et al.
(1956) for a classical treatment). More recently, there has been interest in the problem of com-
puting fixed tolls to induce optimal flows at equilibrium in various settings, usually in non-atomic
congestion games (see e.g. Cole et al. (2003); Fleischer et al. (2004); Karakostas and Kolliopoulos
(2004); Fleischer (2005); Swamy (2007); Fotakis et al. (2010) for a representative but not exhaustive
sample). These papers study variations on the problem in which e.g. tolls represent lost welfare
Cole et al. (2003), or in which agents have heterogenous values for money Fleischer et al. (2004),
or when agents are atomic but flow is splittable Swamy (2007), among others. Tolls in atomic
congestion games have received some attention as well (e.g. Caragiannis et al. (2006)), though to
a lesser degree, since in general atomic congestion games, tolls do not suffice to implement the
optimal flow as the unique equilibrium). These works all assume that agent demands are known,
and do not have to be elicited from strategic agents, which is where the present paper departs from
this literature. Recently, Bhaskar et al. Bhaskar et al. (2014) consider the problem of computing
tolls in a query model in which the latency functions are unknown (demands are known), but not
in a setting in which agents are assumed to be behaving strategically to manipulate the tolls.
Modifying games by adding “mediators” is also well studied, although what exactly is meant
by a mediator differs from paper to paper (see e.g. Monderer and Tennenholtz (2003, 2009);
Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz (2007); Ashlagi et al. (2009); Peleg and Procaccia (2010) for a represen-
tative but not exhaustive sample). The “weak mediators” we study in this paper were introduced in
1The formal notion of largeness we require is detailed in Assumption 2.3.
2Here, on(1) denotes a function of n that approaches 0 as n→∞.
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Kearns et al. (2014); Rogers and Roth (2014), who also use differentially private equilibrium com-
putation to achieve incentive properties. Our work differs from this prior work in that Kearns et al.
(2014); Rogers and Roth (2014) both seek to implement an equilibrium of the given game, and hence
do not achieve welfare guarantees beyond the price of anarchy of the game. In contrast, we use tolls
to modify the original game, and hence implement the socially optimal routing as an equilibrium.
The connection between differential privacy, defined by Dwork et al. (2006), and mechanism
design was first made by McSherry and Talwar (2007), who used it to give improved welfare guar-
antees for digital goods auctions. It has since been used in various contexts, including to design
mechanisms for facility location games and general mechanism design problems without money
Nissim et al. (2012). The connection between joint differential privacy and mechanism design
(which is more subtle, and requires that the private algorithm also compute an equilibrium of
some sort) was made by Kearns et al. (2014) in the context of mediators, and has since been
used in other settings including computing stable matchings Kannan et al. (2015), aggregative
games Cummings et al. (2014), and combinatorial auctions Hsu et al. (2014b).
2 Model
2.1 The Routing Game Problem
In this section we introduce the atomic unsplittable routing game problem that we study. An
instance of a routing game Γ = (G, ℓ, s) is defined by
• A graph G = (V,E). We use m = |E| to denote the number of edges.
• A latency function ℓe : R≥0 → R≥0 for each edge e ∈ E. Each latency function maps the
number of players who send flow along that edge to a non-negative loss.
• A set of n source-destination pairs s = (s1, . . . , sn). Each pair si = (s1i , s2i ) ∈ S ≡ V × V
represents the demand of player i. We use n to denote the number of players.
The objective is to (approximately) minimize the total latency experienced by all the players
in the network. Let F(s) = (F(s1), · · · ,F(sn)) be the set of feasible individual flows for demand s
and F = {F(s) : s ∈ S} be the set of all feasible individual flows. Notice that an element of F(s)
is a vector of n separate flows, one for each player. That is, an individual flow is specified by n×m
variables representing the amount of flow by each player routed on each edge. Specifically, given a
graph G, F(s) is the set of unsplittable flows x = (xi,e)i∈[n],e∈E ∈ {0, 1}n×m such that
bi,u =


1 u = s1i
−1 u = s2i
0 else
(1)
bi,u +
∑
v:(u,v)∈E
xi,(u,v) =
∑
v:(v,u)∈E
xi,(v,u), ∀u ∈ V ∀i ∈ [n] (2)
For a given routing game instance Γ = (G, ℓ, s), we seek a flow x ∈ F(s) that minimizes the average
latency φ(x)
φ(x) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
xi,e · ℓe
(
n∑
i=1
xi,e
)
(3)
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We will sometimes write OPT(s) = φ(x∗), were x∗ is the minimum average cost flow for the
routing game Γ = (G, ℓ, s) when the graph G and latencies ℓ are known from context. In this work
we settle for an approximately minimum average cost flow, which we define below.
Definition 2.1 (Approximately Optimal Flow). For a routing game Γ, and parameter ηopt > 0, a
flow x is ηopt-approximately optimal if x ∈ F(s) and
φ(x) ≤ OPT(s) + ηopt.
We are interested in strategic players that want to minimize their individual cost
φi(x) =
∑
e∈E
xi,e · ℓe

 n∑
j=1
xj,e

 . (4)
We thus define an approximate Nash flow.
Definition 2.2 (Approximate Nash Flow). For a routing game Γ and parameter ηeq > 0, a flow xˆ
is an ηeq-approximate Nash flow if xˆ ∈ F(s) and for every xi ∈ F(si)
φi(xˆ) ≤ φi(xi, xˆ−i) + ηeq ∀xi ∈ F(si).
When xˆ is a 0-approximate Nash flow, we simply say that it is a Nash flow.
Throughout, we will make the following assumptions about the latency functions.
Assumption 2.3. For every edge e ∈ E, the latency function ℓe is (1) non-decreasing, (2) convex,
(3) twice differentiable, (4) bounded by n (i.e. ℓe(n) ≤ n), and (5) γ-lipschitz (i.e. |ℓe(y)− ℓe(y′)| ≤
γ|y − y′| for all e ∈ E) for some constant γ > 0.
Item 1 and 2 are natural and extremely common in the routing games literature. Item 3 is a
technical condition used in our proofs that can likely be removed. Item 4 and 5 are the “largeness
conditions” that ensure no player has large influence on any other’s payoff. If the Lipschitz constant
is zero, then we can choose an upper bound parameter γ > 0 in our analysis.
2.2 Mediators
Given an instance Γ = (G, ℓ, s), we would like the players to coordinate on the social-welfare
maximizing flow x∗ where OPT(s) = φ(x∗). There are two problems: the first is that the optimal
flow is generally not a Nash equilibrium, and the second is that even with knowledge of everyone’s
demands, Nash equilibria are not unique and coordination is a problem. The classical solution to
the first problem is to have an overseer impose edge tolls τ , which are a function of the demands s
of each player. This makes x∗ a Nash flow for the routing game instance Γτ = (G, ℓτ , s) where
ℓτe(y) = ℓe(y) + τe.
However the tolls that cause the optimal flow to be an equilibrium depend on the demands,
and so this approach fails if the overseer does not know s. A simple solution would be to elicit
the demands from the players, but since the correct tolls depend on the demands, naively eliciting
them may not lead to a truthful mechanism.
We solve this problem, as well as the equilibrium selection problem mentioned above, by intro-
ducing a mediator that takes as input the demand of each player and outputs a set of tolls for each
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edge, together with a suggested route for each player to use. Ideally, the players will report their
demands truthfully, the aggregate of the routes suggested by the mediator will be a social-welfare
maximizing flow x∗, agents will faithfully follow their suggestion, and the tolls will be chosen to
make x∗ an (approximate) Nash flow. However, players have the option to deviate from this desired
behavior in several ways: they may not report their demand to the mediator at all, might report a
false demand, or might not follow the mediator’s suggestion once it is given. Our goal in designing
the mediator is to guarantee that players never have significant incentive to deviate from the desired
behavior described above.
Formally, introducing the mediator gives rise to a modified game ΓM = (G, ℓ, s,M). The
mediator is an algorithm M : {⊥∪S}n → Fn×Rm. The input from each player is either a demand
or a ⊥ symbol indicating that the player opts out. The output is a set of routes, one suggested to
each player, together with a collection of tolls, one for each edge. We write the output as
M(s) =
((
MFi (s)
)
i∈[n] ,M
τ (s)
)
.
The edge tolls M τ (s) = (M τe (s))e∈E that M outputs will enforce the optimal flow induced by the
reported demands. Note that the tolls that M outputs to each player are the same (i.e. the players
are not charged personalized tolls; rather there is a single toll on each edge that must be paid by
any player using that edge).
In ΓM each player can opt-out of using the mediator, denoted by the report ⊥, and then select
some way to route from his source to his destination, or a player can opt-in to using the mediator,
but not necessarily reveal her true demand, and then the mediator will suggest a path xi to route
her unit flow from the reported source to the destination. Players are free to follow the suggested
action, but they can also use the suggestion as part of an arbitrary deviation, i.e. they can play
any action f(xi) for any f : F → F . Thus, the action set A for any player for the game instance
ΓM is A = A1 ∪A2 where A1 = {(s′, f) : s′ ∈ S, f : F → F} and A2 = {(⊥, f) : f constant }.
We next define the cost function for each player in ΓM , but first we must present some notation.
Let F be the set of possible functions fi : F → F , where fi(xi) = (fi,e(xi,e))e∈E . We further
write fe(x) =
∑n
i=1 fi,e(xi,e) as the new congestion on edge e when players have deviated from x
according to functions fi for i ∈ [n]. We will consider only randomized algorithms, so our cost is
an expectation over outcomes of M . More formally, the cost φM that each player experiences in
ΓM is defined as
φM : S × [(⊥ ∪ S)× F]n → R
φM (si, (s
′, f)) := E
(x,τ)∼M(s′)

∑
e∈E
fi,e(xi,e)

ℓe (fe(x)) + τe︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓτe (fe(x))




where si is player i’s true source-destination pair.
We are interested in designing mediators such that good behavior in the mediated game is an
ex-post Nash equilibrium, which we define below.
Definition 2.4 (Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium). A set of strategies {σi : S → A}ni=1 forms an η-
approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium if for every profile of demands s ∈ Sn, and for every player
i and action ai ∈ A:
φM (si, (σi(si), σ−i(s−i))) ≤ φM (si, (ai, σ−i(s−i))) + η.
That is, it forms an η-approximate Nash equilibrium for every realization of demands.
8
Our goal is to incentivize players to follow good behavior—truthfully reporting their demand,
and then faithfully following the suggested action of the mediator. Formally, the good behavior
strategy for player i is ξi(si) = (si, id) where si is i’s actual demand, and id : F → F is the identity
map. We write ξi = ξi(si) for the good behavior strategy.
To accomplish this goal, we will design a mediator that is “insensitive” to the reported demand
of each player. Informally, if a player’s reported demand does not substantially effect the tolls
chosen by the mediator, or the paths suggested to other players, then a player has little incentive
to lie about his demand (of course any mediator with this property must necessarily allow the path
suggested to agent i to depend strongly on agent i’s own reported demand!). We capture this notion
of insensitivity using joint differential privacy Kearns et al. (2014), which is defined as follows.
Definition 2.5. (Joint Differential Privacy Kearns et al. (2014)) A randomized algorithm M :
Sn → On, where O is an arbitrary output set for each player, satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential
privacy if for every player i, every pair si, s
′
i ∈ S, any tuple s−i ∈ Sn−1 and any B−i ⊆ On−1, we
have P [M(si, s−i)−i ∈ B−i] ≤ eε · P [M(s′i, s−i)−i ∈ B−i] + δ.
Joint differential privacy (JDP) is a relaxation of the notion of differential privacy (DP) Dwork et al.
(2006). We state the definition of DP below, both for comparison, and because it will be important
technically in designing our mediator.
Definition 2.6. (Differential Privacy Dwork et al. (2006)) A randomized algorithm M : Sn → O
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any player i, any two si, s
′
i ∈ S, any tuple s−i ∈ Sn−1, and
any B ⊆ O we have P [M(si, s−i) ∈ B] ≤ eε · P [M(s′i, s−i) ∈ B] + δ.
Note that JDP is weaker than DP, because JDP assumes that the output space of the algorithm
is partitioned among the n players, and the output to player i can depend arbitrarily on the input
of player i, and only the output to players j 6= i must be insensitive to the input of player i. This
distinction is crucial in mechanism design settings—the output to player i is a suggested route for
player i to follow, and thus should satisfy player i’s reported demand, which is highly sensitive to
the input of player i. Also note that since our mediator will output the same tolls to every player,
the tolls computed by the mediator must satisfy standard DP.
A key property we use is that a JDP mediator that also computes an equilibrium of the un-
derlying game gives rise to an approximately truthful mechanism. This result was first shown in
Kearns et al. (2014); Rogers and Roth (2014), although for simpler models that do not include
tolls. We now state and prove a simple extension of this result that is appropriate for our setting.
Theorem 2.7. Given routing game Γ = (G, ℓ, s) and upper bound U on the tolls, letM : (⊥∪S)n →
Fn × [0, U ]m where M(s′) = (MFi (s′),M τ (s′))i∈[n] satisfies
1. M is (ε, δ)-joint differentially private.
2. For any input demand profile s, we have with probability 1 − β that x = (MFi (s))ni=1 is an
ηeq-approximate Nash flow in the modified routing game Γ
τ = (G, ℓM , s) where
ℓMe (y) := ℓe(y) +M
τ
e (s) ∀e ∈ E.
Then the good behavior strategy ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) forms an η-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium
in ΓM = (G, ℓ, s,M), where
η = ηeq +m(U + n)(2ε + β + δ).
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Proof. We fix s ∈ Sn to be the true source destination of the players. We consider a unilateral
deviation ξ′i(si) = (s
′
i, f
′
i) for player i to report s
′
i and use f
′
i , which we write as ξ
′
i. We write the
modified cost function for player i in Γτ with tolls τe =M
τ
e (s) to be
φτi (xi,x−i) =
∑
e∈E
xi,e

ℓe

 n∑
j=1
xj,e

+ τe


We define the best response flow that player i of demand si can route given the flows of the other
players to be
BRτi (x−i) = argmin
xi∈F(si)
{φτi (xi,x−i)} .
We first condition on the event that M gives an ηeq-approximate Nash flow in Γ
τ .
φM (si, (ξi, ξ−i)) = E
(x,τ)∼M(s)
[φτi (xi,x−i)] ≤ E
(x,τ)∼M(s)
[φτi (BR
τ
i (x−i),x−i)] + ηeq
We then use the fact that M is JDP. We write s′ = (s′i, s−i).
φM (si, (ξi, ξ−i)) ≤ eε
(
E
(x,τ)∼M(s′)
[φτi (BR
τ
i (x−i),x−i)]
)
+m(U + n)δ + ηeq
≤ E
(x,τ)∼M(s′)
[φτi (BR
τ
i (x−i),x−i)] +m(U + n) (2ε+ δ) + ηeq
≤ E
(x,τ)∼M(s′)
[
φτi (f
′
i(xi),x−i)
]
+m(U + n) (2ε+ δ) + ηeq
The first inequality comes from using the fact that M is (ε, δ)-JDP and the fact that φτi (x) ≤
m(U+n). The second inequality uses the fact that eε ≤ 1+2ε for ε < 1. The last inequality follows
from the fact that player i can only do worse by not best responding to the other players’ flows.
Lastly, we know that M does not produce an ηeq-approximate Nash flow in Γ
τ with probability less
than β, which gives the additional β term in the theorem statement.
The rest of the paper will be dedicated to constructing such a mediator that satisfies the
hypotheses in Theorem 2.7. We now state the main result of our paper.
Theorem 2.8. For routing games Γ that satisfy Assumption 2.3 and parameter β > 0, there exists
a mediator M : {⊥ ∪ S}n → Fn × [0, nγ]m such that with probability 1− β good behavior forms an
η-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium in ΓM where
η = O˜
(
m3/2n4/5
)
and the resulting flow from the good behavior strategy is ηopt-approximately optimal for
ηopt = O˜
(
mn4/5
)
.
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3 Flow Mediator with Tolls
We start by presenting a high level overview of the design of our algorithm. Our goal is to design a
mediator that takes as input the demands, or source-destination pairs, s of the players and outputs
a nearly optimal flow x• for Γ = (G, ℓ, s) together with edge tolls τ , such that the tolls are not
heavily influenced by any single player’s report and no one’s report has major influence on the flow
induced by the other players. Further, we need the tolls τ to be carefully computed so that x• is
also an approximate Nash flow in the instance Γτ = (G, ℓτ , s). We construct such a mediator in
the following way:
1. We compute an approximately optimal flow x• subject to JDP, using a privacy preserving
variant of projected gradient descent. This ends up being the most technical part of the paper
and so we leave the details to Section 4 and give the formal algorithm P-GD in Algorithm
6.For the rest of this section we assume we have x•.
2. Given x•, we need to compute the necessary tolls τˆ such that players are approximately best
responding in Γτˆ = (G, ℓτˆ , s) when playing x•. We compute τˆ as a function of a noisy version
of the edge congestion yˆ induced by the flow x• so that τˆ is DP. We give the procedure
P-CON that computes yˆ in Algorithm 2. We must be cautious at this step because x• is only
approximately optimal (and the tolls are computed with respect to a perturbed version of
the induced congestion), so there may be a few players that are not playing approximate best
responses in Γτˆ . We call these players unsatisfied.
3. We show that the number of unsatisfied players in Γτˆ with flow x• is small, so we can
modify x• by having the unsatisfied players play best responses to the induced flow. Because
the number of unsatisfied players was small, we can show that this modification does not
substantially reduce the payoff of the other players. Therefore, if those players were playing
approximate best responses before the modification, they will continue to do so after. The
procedure P-BR, given in Algorithm 3, ensures every player is approximately best responding.
The result is a slightly modified flow xˆ which is nearly optimal in Γ and an approximate Nash
flow in Γτˆ .
4. The final output is then xˆ and τˆ .
Our mediator FlowToll is formally given in Algorithm 1 and is composed of the subroutines
described above. In FlowToll we are using P-GD as a black box that computes an α-approximate
optimal flow. Theorem 4.10 shows that we can set
α = O˜
(√
nm5/4√
ε
)
. (5)
The rest of this paper is dedicated to analyzing the subroutines of FlowToll.
Remark 3.1. Throughout our discussion of the subroutines, we will sometimes say “player i
plays...” or “player i best responds to...” to describe player i’s action in some flow computed
by these subroutines. While these descriptions are natural, they could be slightly misleading. We
want to clarify that our mediator mechanism is not interactive or online, and all the computation
is done by the algorithm. The players will simply submit their private source-destination pairs and
will only receive a suggested feasible path along with the tolls over the edges.
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Algorithm 1 Flow Mediator with Tolls
Input: A routing game instance Γ = (G, ℓ, s); privacy parameter (ε, δ); failure probability β
Output: xˆi, a (s
1
i , s
2
i )-flow for each player i ∈ [n], and a toll τˆe for each edge e ∈ E
procedure FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β)
1. Compute an α-approximately optimal flow
x• ← P-GD
(
Γ,
ε
4
,
δ
2
,
β
2
)
.
2. Compute congestion yˆ← P-CON(x•, ε/4) and tolls τˆ ← τ∗(yˆe) where τ∗(·) is given in (6).
3. Improve some players’ paths
xˆ← P-BR
(
Γτˆ , yˆ,x•, 4
√
mγα+
8γm2 log(2m/β)
ε
)
.
return xˆ and τˆ
end procedure
3.1 Private Tolls Mechanism
We show in this section that given an approximately optimal flow x• we can compute the necessary
tolls τˆ in a DP way. Ultimately, we want to compute constant tolls, but a useful intermediate step
is to consider the following functional tolls, which are edge tolls that can depend on the congestion
on that edge. Specifically, we define the marginal-cost toll τ∗e : R→ R for each edge e ∈ E to be
τ∗e (y) = (y − 1)(ℓe(y)− ℓe(y − 1)), (6)
which gives rise to a different routing game Γτ
∗
= (G, ℓτ
∗
, s) with latency function defined as
ℓτ
∗
e (y) = ℓe(y) + τ
∗
e (y) for e ∈ E.
We first show that a marginal-cost toll enforces the optimal flow in an atomic, unsplittable
routing game, and then show how to use this fact to privately compute constant tolls that ap-
proximately enforce the optimal flow at equilibrium. Recall the classical potential function method
Monderer and Shapley (1996) for congestion games that defines a potential function Ψ : Rn×m → R
such that a flow x that minimizes Ψ is also a (exact) Nash flow in Γτ
∗
= (G, ℓτ
∗
, s), where
Ψ(x) :=
∑
e∈E
ye∑
i=1
ℓτ
∗
e (i) =
∑
e∈E
ye∑
i=1
[ℓe(i) + τ
∗
e (i)] , and ye =
∑
i∈[n]
xi,e. (7)
Lemma 3.2. Let x∗ be the (exact) optimal flow in routing game Γ = (G, ℓ, s), then x∗ is a Nash
flow in Γτ
∗
= (G, ℓτ
∗
, s)
Proof. First, we show that n · φ(x) = Ψ(x) where φ is given in (3):
Ψ(x) =
∑
e
ye∑
i=1
[ℓe(i) + τ
∗
e (i)] =
∑
e
ye∑
i=1
[ℓe(i) + (i− 1)(ℓe(i)− ℓe(i− 1))]
=
∑
e
ye∑
i=1
[i ℓe(i)− (i− 1) ℓe(i− 1)] =
∑
e
[ye ℓe(ye)− 0 ℓe(0)] =
∑
e
ye ℓe(ye) = n · φ(x).
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Note that x∗ minimizes the potential function Ψ. We know from Monderer and Shapley (1996)
that the flow that minimizes the potential function Ψ is a Nash flow of the routing game Γτ
∗
. Hence
x∗ is a Nash flow.
Since we only have access to an approximately optimal flow x•, we will compute the marginal-
cost tolls based on x• instead. In order to release DP tolls, we compute them using a private version
yˆe of the total edge congestion ye =
∑
i x
•
i,e that is output by P-CON (presented in Algorithm 2).
Using a standard technique in differential privacy, we can release a private version of the edge
congestion by perturbing the congestion on each edge with noise from an appropriately scaled
Laplace distribution. Since the analysis is standard, we defer the details to Section A.1. Lastly, to
get the constant tolls for the mediator FlowToll, we will evaluate the marginal-cost toll function
on the perturbed edge congestion yˆ: set τˆe = τ
∗
e (yˆe) for e ∈ E.
Algorithm 2 Private Congestion
Input: Flow x, privacy parameter ε
Output: Aggregate flow yˆ = (yˆe)e∈E
procedure P-CON(x, ε)
for each edge e ∈ E do
Let yˆe =
∑
i xi,e + Ze, where Ze∼Lap(m/ε).
if yˆe > n then
yˆe ← n.
return yˆ
end procedure
To show that the constant tolls τˆ are private, we need to first show that the noisy congestion yˆ
output by P-CON is DP in the demands s. We will show later that P-GD which computes x• is JDP
in s. We then use x• as input to P-CON, which we know is DP with respect to any flow input x.
To bridge the two privacy guarantees, we rely on the following composition lemma (with proof in
Appendix A.3) to show that yˆ is DP in s.
Lemma 3.3. Let MJ : Sn → X n be (εJ , δ)-jointly differentially private. Further, let MD : X n → O
be εD-differentially private. If M : Sn → O is defined as
M(s) =MD(MJ(s))
then M is (2εD + εJ , δ)-differentially private.
Now we are ready to establish the privacy guarantee of both yˆ and τˆ .
Corollary 3.4. Given the approximately optimal flow x• computed from P-GD(Γ, ε/4, δ/2, β/2),
the perturbed congestion yˆ output by P-CON(x•, ε/4) and the constant tolls τˆ = (τ∗e (yˆe))e∈E are
(3ε/4, δ/2)-differentially private in the demands s.
Proof. Note that x• is output by P-GD(Γ, ε/4, δ/2, β/2), so it is (ε/4, δ/2)-JDP in s. Using analysis
of the Laplace mechanism(Section A.1), we know that P-CON(x•, ε/4) is (ε/4)-DP in x•. Therefore,
the noisy congestion yˆ output by the composition of these two functions is (3ε/4, δ/2)-DP by
Lemma 3.3. Since τˆ is simply a post-processing of the noisy congestion yˆ, we know that τˆ is
(3ε/4, δ/2)-DPby Lemma A.1.
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3.2 Simultaneous Best Responses of Unsatisfied Players
At this point of the mechanism, we have computed the approximately optimal flow x• and constant
tolls τˆ that define the tolled routing game Γτˆ . In this section, we show how to modify x• to obtain
a new approximately optimal flow xˆ that is also an approximate Nash equilibrium in the presence
of the same constant tolls τˆ .
Recall from Lemma 3.2 that there is an exactly optimal flow x∗ and functional tolls τ∗ such
that x∗ is an exact Nash flow of the routing game under tolls τ∗. Our flow-toll pair (x•, τˆ ) differs
from (x∗, τ∗) in three ways.
1. The flow x• is only approximately optimal.
2. The tolls τˆ we impose on the edges are constants while the functional tolls τ∗ may be functions
of the congestion.
3. Tolls τˆ are derived from noisy congestion yˆ, not the exact congestion y• =
∑
i x
•
i .
As a result, there may be some unsatisfied players who could significantly benefit from deviating
from x•. We obtain the new approximate Nash flow xˆ by rerouting the unsatisfied players in x•
along their best response route in the flow x• with constant edge tolls τˆ . To analyze the new flow
xˆ, we show that there are not too many unsatisfied players. Thus, even if we modify the routes of
all of the unsatisfied players, the overall congestion does not change too much, and thus the players
who were previously satisfied remain satisfied.
To determine if a player is unsatisfied and what their best response is, we need to know the
costs they face for different paths, which depends on the flow y• =
∑
i x
•
i . However, to ensure
privacy, we only have access to a perturbed flow yˆ. Thus, we will define unsatisfied players relative
to this noisy flow yˆ computed by P-CON. More generally we can define the best response function
of a player relative to any flow y.
Given any congestion y (not necessarily even a sum of feasible individual flows) and routing
game Γ = (G, ℓ, s), we define cxi(y) to be player i’s cost for routing on path xi under the congestion
of y, that is
cxi(y) =
∑
e∈E
xi,e · ℓe(ye). (8)
Note that
∑n
i=1 cxi(y) = nφ(x) and cxi(y) = φi(x) when ye =
∑n
i=1 xi,e for e ∈ E. We then define
the condition for being unsatisfied with respect to congestion y as follows.
Definition 3.5. Given congestion y and routing game Γ = (G, ℓ, s), we say that a player i with
si-flow xi is ρ-unsatisfied with respect to y if he could decrease his cost by at least ρ via a unilateral
deviation. That is, there exists a path x′i ∈ F(si) such that
cx′i(y
′) ≤ cxi(y) − ρ
where y′ = y−xi+x′i is the flow that would result from player i making this deviation. If player i
is not ρ-unsatisfied, then we say i is ρ-satisfied. We will sometimes omit y if it is clear from context.
The next lemma bounds the number of unsatisfied players in x• in the routing game Γτˆ =
(G, ℓ+ τˆ , s) with respect to the noisy congestion yˆ.
Lemma 3.6. Let x• be an α-approximately optimal flow, yˆ = P-CON(x•, ε) be the noisy aggregate
flow, and τˆ = τ∗(yˆ) be a vector of constant tolls. Then with probability at least 1−β for β > 0, there
14
are at most
√
nα/4mγ players who are ζˆε-unsatisfied players in Γ
τˆ with respect to the congestion
yˆ, for
ζˆε = 4
√
mnγα+ 8
γm2 log(m/β)
ε
. (9)
We will now give a rough sketch of the proof, . The full proof appears in Appendix B.
Proof Sketch. First, we will consider the routing game Γτ
∗
under the (functional) marginal-cost
toll. We will also assume for now that we have the exact congestion y• =
∑
i x
•
i . Recall from
Lemma 3.2 that the potential function Ψ for this game is equal to the total congestion cost n · φ.
Since x• is an α-approximate optimal flow, it also approximately minimizes Ψ up to error n · α.
The construction of Ψ is such that if a player who is ρ-unsatisfied with respect to y• plays her
best response, then Ψ decreases by at least ρ. Therefore the number of ρ-unsatisfied players with
respect to y• is at most nα/ρ. Here we are intentionally being slightly imprecise to ease exposition.
See the full proof for details.
Now, consider the routing game Γτ = (G, ℓ + τ, s) that arises from using the constant tolls
τ = τ∗(y•). Note that under functional tolls τ∗, when a player best responds, the tolls may change,
however under constant tolls τ the tolls do not change. This might increase the number of players
who can gain by deviating. However, notice that when one player changes their route, the tools τ∗e
and τe can only change by γ, since τ
∗
e is γ-Lipschitz. Thus changing from tolls τ
∗ to τ can only
change the cost any player faces on any route by mγ. Therefore, we can argue that the number of
(ρ+ 2mγ)-unsatisfied players with respect to y• in the game Γτ is also at most nα/ρ.
The last issue to address is that we compute the tolls from the noisy congestion yˆ instead of
the exact congestion y•. This has two effects: 1) the constant tolls τˆ = τ∗(yˆ) are different from
the constant tolls τ = τ∗(y•) analyzed above and 2) we want to measure the number of unsatisfied
players with respect to yˆ instead of y•. We can address both of these issues using the fact that the
noise is small on every edge. Therefore |ye− yˆe| is small, and since τ∗e is Lipschitz, |τe− τˆe| is small
as well. In the full proof we carefully account for the magnitude of the noise and its effect on the
cost faced by each player to obtain the guarantees stated in the lemma.
We have so far shown that there might be a few players that are unsatisfied with their current
route in Γτˆ = (G, ℓ + τˆ , s) when they only know a perturbed version of the congestion yˆ. We
then let these unsatisfied players simultaneously change routes to the routes with the lowest cost
(according to the cost cxi(y)). This procedure, P-BR, is detailed in Algorithm 3.
We are now ready to show that the final flow assignments xˆ resulting from the procedure
P-BR(Γτˆ ,x•, ζˆε), where x• is an α-approximate optimal flow in Γ and ζˆε is given in (9), forms an
approximate Nash equilibrium in the game Γτˆ and remains an approximately optimal flow for the
original routing game instance Γ.
Lemma 3.7. Fix any α > 0 and β, ε ∈ (0, 1). Let Γ = (G, ℓ, s) be a routing game and x• be an α-
approximately optimal flow in Γ. Let xˆ = P-BR(Γτˆ , yˆ,x•, ζˆε) for ζˆε given in (9), yˆ = P-CON(x•, ε),
and τˆ = τ∗(yˆ). Then with probability at least 1− β, xˆ is an ηeq(α)-Nash flow in Γτˆ = (G, ℓ+ τˆ , s)
where
ηeq(α) = O
(√
mnα+
m2 log(m/β)
ε
)
. (10)
and xˆ is an ηopt(α)-approximate Nash flow in Γ where
ηopt(α) = O
(
α+
√
mnα
)
. (11)
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Algorithm 3 Private Best Responses
Input: Routing game instance Γ, congestion y, flow assignment x, satisfaction parameter ζ
Output: New flow assignment xˆ
procedure P-BR(Γ,y,x, ζ)
Let xˆ← x
for each player i ∈ [n] do
if i with flow xi is ζ-unsatisfied with respect to congestion y in game Γ then
Replace xˆi by the route with the lowest cost given congestion y.
xˆi ← argmax
x
′
i
{
cx′i
(
y′
)}
(breaking ties arbitrarily)
Where y′e = ye − 1 if xi,e = 1, x′i,e = 0; y′e = ye + 1 if xi,e = 0, x′i,e = 1; else ye = y′e.
return xˆ
end procedure
Proof. First, to show that xˆ forms an approximate Nash flow, we need to argue that all players
are approximately satisfied with respect to the actual congestion y =
∑
i xˆi. As an intermediate
step, we will first show that all players in xˆ are approximately satisfied with the input perturbed
congestion yˆ.
By Lemma 3.6, we know that the number of ζˆε-unsatisfied players that deviate in our instanti-
ation of P-BR is bounded by √
nα/(2
√
mγ) ≡ K.
After these players’ joint deviation, the congestion on any path is changed by at most mK, so the
total cost on any path is changed by at mostmγK =
√
mnαγ/2. Therefore, the players that deviate
are
√
mnαγ-satisfied in Γτˆ with respect to congestion yˆ after the simultaneous moves. Similarly,
the players that were originally ζˆε-satisfied in Γ
τˆ with congestion yˆ remain (ζˆε+
√
mnαγ)-satisfied
with yˆ even after the joint deviations.
From standard bounds on the tails of Laplace distribution(Lemma A.4), we can bound the
difference between yˆ and
∑
i x
•
i : with probability at least 1− β,
‖yˆ −
∑
i
x•i ‖∞ ≤ 2m log(m/β)/ε
Since the number of players that deviate in P-BR is bounded by K, we could bound ‖y−∑i x•i ‖∞ ≤
K. By triangle inequality, we get
‖yˆ − y‖∞ ≤ 2m log(m/β)/ε +K.
Since all players in xˆ are (ζˆε +
√
mnαγ)-satisfied with congestion yˆ, by Lemma B.4, we knowthat
they are also ηeq-satisfied with the actual congestion y, where
ηeq = ζˆε +
√
mnαγ +
4γm2 log(m/β)
ε
+ 2Kγm = 6
√
mnαγ +
12γm2 log(m/β)
ε
.
Hence, the flow xˆ forms an ηeq-approximate Nash flow in game Γ
τˆ . To bound the cost of xˆ,
note that for each edge e, the number of players can increase by at most K. Let y• =
∑
i x
•
i , then
for each edge, yeℓe(ye)− y•eℓe (y•e) ≤ nγK + nγ = nK(γ + 1).
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Therefore, the average cost for xˆ is
φ(xˆ) =
1
n
∑
e∈E
yeℓe(ye) ≤ 1
n
∑
e∈E
y•eℓe(y
•
e) +mK(γ + 1) ≤ OPT(s) + α+
√
mnγα
2
+
√
mnα
2
√
γ
This completes the proof.
3.3 Analysis of FlowToll
Now that we have analyzed the subroutines P-CON and P-BR along with computing the private
tolls τˆ , we are ready to analyze the complete mediator FlowToll. Note that in this analysis we
will assume that the subroutine P-GD is a blackbox that is JDP and computes an approximately
optimal flow in Γ.
We first prove that the mediator FlowToll is JDP. This will give the first condition we require of
our mediator in Theorem 2.7. A useful tool in proving mechanisms are JDP is the billboard lemma,
which states at a high level that if amechanism can be viewed as posting some public signal (i.e.
as if on “a billboard”) that is DP in the players’ demands, from which (together with knowledge of
their own demand) players can derive their part of the output of the mechanism, then the resulting
mechanism is JDP.
Lemma 3.8 (Billboard Lemma Rogers and Roth (2014); Hsu et al. (2014a)). Let M : Sn → O be
an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism and consider any function θ : S × O → A. Define the
mechanism M ′ : Sn → An as follows: on input s, M′ computes o =M(s), and then M′(s) outputs
to each i:
M′(s)i = θ(si, o).
M′ is then (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private.
We show that FlowToll is jointly differentially private via the billboard lemma.
Theorem 3.9. For ε, δ, β > 0, the procedure FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β) in Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-joint
differentially private in the player’s input demands s.
Proof. In order to show JDP using the Billboard Lemma, we need to show that for each player
i, the output flow xˆi and toll vector τˆ can be computed only based on i’s demands si and some
(ε, δ)-DP signal.
In Theorem 4.2, we show that the subroutine P-GD(Γ, ε/4, δ/2, β/2) operates in the Billboard
model, and can be computed from some (ε/4, δ/2)-DP billboard signal Λ.
Note that the output flow xˆi for each player i produced by P-BR(Γ
τˆ , yˆ,x•, ζˆε/4) is just a
function of the perturbed congestion yˆ, x•i and player i’s demand. Recall that we know that
yˆ = P-CON(x•, ε/4) is (3ε/4, δ/2)-DP in s by Corollary 3.4. Therefore, the output flow xˆi for each
i is just a function of the (ε, δ)-DP signal (Λ, yˆ), and i’s demand si. Also, the tolls τˆ are computed
as a function only of yˆ. Therefore, by the Billboard Lemma 3.8, the mediator FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β)
satisfies (ε, δ)-JDP.
Now we give the appropriate choices of the parameters (ε, δ, β) for FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β) that leads
to our main result in the following theorem. This result follows from instantiating Theorem 2.7
with a JDP algorithm that computes an approximately optimal flow xˆ and tolls τˆ such that xˆ forms
an approximate equilibrium in the routing game with tolls τˆ .
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Proof of Theorem 2.8. Given any routing game instance Γ = (G, ℓ, s), we first show that FlowToll
is a mediator that makes good behavior an η-approximate Nash equilibrium of the mediated game
ΓFlowToll for η = O˜
(
m3/2n4/5
)
.
We assume that P-GD(Γ, ε/2, δ/2, β/2) produces an α-approximate optimal flow x• with prob-
ability 1 − β/2 (leaving the formal proofs to Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.10) where α is given in
(5). Consider the instantiation of FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β) with
ε =
√
m
n1/5
, δ = n−2, β = n−2.
Given the functional tolls τ∗ defined in (6) and the fact that if we ever get an edge congestion
yˆe > n from the output of P-CON then we round it down to n, so the edge tolls τˆe are never bigger
than nγ. Using our bound for ηeq(α) in (10) and setting ηeq = ηeq(α) where α is as above, from
Theorem 2.7 we have with probability 1−β the bound η ≤ ηeq+m(U+n)(2ε+β+δ) = O˜
(
m3/2n4/5
)
.
We then show that good behavior results in an ηopt-approximately optimal flow for the original
routing game instance Γ, where
ηopt = O˜
(
mn4/5
)
.
It then follows that ηopt = ηopt(α) from (11) and for α given in (5).
4 Computing an Approximately Optimal Flow under JDP
In this section we show how to compute an approximately optimal flow x• under joint differential
privacy. We first consider a convex relaxation of the problem of minimizing social cost in the routing
game instance (Γ, ℓ, s). Let FR(s) ⊆ [0, 1]n×m be the set of feasible fractional flows (i.e. the convex
relaxation of the set F(s)). Then the optimal fractional flow is given by the convex program:
min c(y) =
1
n
∑
e∈E
yeℓe(ye) (12)
such that x ∈ FR(s) ⊆ [0, 1]n×m
ye =
n∑
i=1
xi,e ∀e ∈ E, ∀i ∈ [n] (13)
Note that the second derivative of yeℓe(y) is 2ℓ
′
e(ye) + yeℓ
′′
e(ye). Since ℓe is assumed to be convex
and nondecreasing, the second derivative is non-negative as long as ye ≥ 0. Hence the objective
function c of this program is indeed convex on the feasible region.
We write GR(s) := FR(s) × [0, n]m to denote the space where the decision variables reside, i.e.
(x,y) ∈ GR(s). Given any demands s, we write OPTR(s) to denote the optimal objective value of
the convex program and OPT(s) to be the optimal objective value when x ∈ F(s). Note that we
always have OPTR(s) ≤ OPT(s)
Our goal is to first compute an approximately optimal solution to the relaxed convex program,
and then round the resulting fractional solution to be integral. We then show that the final solution
is an approximately optimal flow to the original instance Γ.
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4.1 The JDP Gradient Descent Algorithm
We will work extensively with the Lagrangian of our problem. For each constraint of (13), we
introduce a dual variable λe. The Lagrangian is then
L(x,y, λ) = c(y)−
∑
e∈E
λe
(∑
i
xi,e − ye
)
.
Since our convex program satisfies Slater’s condition Slater (1959), we know that strong duality
holds:
max
λ∈Rm
min
(x,y)∈GR(s)
L(x,y, λ) = min
(x,y)∈GR(s)
max
λ∈Rm
L(x,y, λ) = OPTR(s). (14)
We will interpret the Lagrangian objective as the payoff function of a zero-sum game between
the minimization player, who plays flows z = (x,y), and the maximization player, who plays dual
variables λ. We will abuse notation and write L(z, λ) = L(x,y, λ). We refer to the game defined
by this payoff matrix the Lagrangian game. We will privately compute an approximate equilibrium
of the Lagrangian game by simulating repeated plays between the two players. In each step, the
dual player will play an approximate best response to the flow player’s strategy. The flow player
will update his flow using a no-regret algorithm.
In particular, the flow player uses an online gradient descent algorithm to produce a se-
quence of T actions {z(1), . . . , z(T )} based on the loss functions given by the dual player’s actions
{λ(1), . . . , λ(T )}. At each round t = 1, . . . , T , the flow player will update both x(t) and y(t) using
the projected gradient update step GD in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Gradient Descent with Projection
Input: Convex feasible domain D, a convex function r, some ω ∈ D, and learning parameter η.
Output: Some new ω′ ∈ D.
procedure GD(D, r, ω, η)
We define the projection map ΠD as
ΠD(v′) = argmin
v∈D
||v − v′||2
We then set
ω′ ← ΠD(ω − η∇r(ω))
return ω′
end procedure
In order to reason about how quickly the projected gradient procedure converges to an approx-
imately optimal flow, we need to bound the diameter of the space of dual solutions. We will also
need to argue that bounding the space of feasible dual solutions does not affect the value of the
game. Specifically, we will bound the dual players’ action to the set
B = {λ ∈ Rm | ‖λ‖1 ≤ 2m}, (15)
Then fixing a flow played by the primal player, the dual player’s best response is simply to select
an edge e where the constraint (13) is most violated and set λ
(t)
e = ±2m. Notice that, since the
constraints depend on the source/sink pairs, and we need to ensure joint differential privacy with
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respect to this data, we must select the most violated constraint in a way that maintains privacy.
Using a straightforward application of the DP exponential mechanism McSherry and Talwar (2007),
we can obtain a constraint that is approximately the most violated. Since this step is standard, we
defer the details to the appendix.
From the repeated plays of the Lagrangian Game, we will obtain a fractional solution z = (x,y)
to the convex program. Finally, we will round the fractional flow x to an integral solution x• for
the original minimum-cost flow instance Γ = (G, ℓ, s) using the rounding procedure PSRR proposed
by Raghavan and Thompson (1987), given in Algorithm 5. The full procedure P-GD is given in
Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 5 Path Stripping and Randomized Rounding
Input: A fractional flow solution xi ∈ FR(si) for player i
Output: An integral flow solution xi ∈ F(si) for player i
procedure PSRR(xi)
Let Λi = {Pj} be the set of (s1i , s2i )-paths in G
for each path Pj do
Let wj = min{xi,e | e ∈ Pj}
for each edge e ∈ Pj do
Let xi,e ← xi,e − wj
Sample a path P from Λi such that P [P = Pj ] = wj
for each edge e ∈ E do
Let xi,e = I[e ∈ P ]
return xi
end procedure
4.2 Privacy of the JDP Gradient Descent Algorithm
We will use Lemma 3.8 (the billboard lemma) to prove that P-GD satisfies joint differential privacy.
We first show that the sequence of plays by the dual player satisfies standard differential privacy.
Lemma 4.1. The sequence {λ(t)}Tt=1 in P-GD(Γ, ε, δ, β) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy in the
reported types s of the players.
Proof. At each iteration of the main for-loop, we use the exponential mechanism with quality score
q to find which edge e has the most violated constraint in (13). By Lemma A.5, each tuple3
(•(t), e(t))is ε′-differentially private. Note that the dual strategy λ(t) is simply a post-processing
function of the tuple (•(t), e(t)), and by Lemma A.1, we know that λ(t) is ε′-differentially private.
By the composition theorem for differential privacy (Lemma A.8), we know that the sequence of
the dual plays λ(t) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy, with the assignment of ε′ in P-GD.
We are now ready to show that our algorithm satisfies joint differential privacy.
Theorem 4.2. P-GD(Γ, ε, δ, β) given in Algorithm 6 is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private.
Proof. In order to establish joint differential privacy using the Billboard Lemma (Lemma 3.8), we
just need to show that the output solution {xi} for each player i is just a function of the dual plays
{λ(t)} and i’s private data.
3Recall that • ∈ {+,−} indicating whether
∑
i xi,e > ye or
∑
i xi,e < ye
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Algorithm 6 Computing Approximately Optimal Flow via JDP Gradient Descent
Input: Routing Game Γ = (G, ℓ, s); privacy parameters (ε, δ); failure probability β
Output: x•i , a si = (s
1
i , s
2
i ) flow for each player i ∈ [n]
procedure P-GD(Γ, ǫ, δ, β)
Define the following quantities:
T ← Θ
(
ǫn
√
m
log(mn/β)
√
log(1/δ)
)
ε′ ← ε/
√
8T ln(1/δ) ηy ← Dy
Gy
√
T
ηx ← Dx
Gx
√
T
Gy ←
√
(m− 1)(γ + 1)2 + (γ + 1 + 2m)2 Dy ← n
√
m
Gx ← 2m
√
n Dx ←
√
mn
Initialize: y(1) ∈ [0, n]m and x(1) ∈ FR(s). Let z(1) ← (x(1),y(1))
Define the quality score q : G(s)× ((+,−)× E)→ R:
fe(z)←
∑
i
xie − ye q(z, (+, e))← +fe(z) q(z, (−, e))← −fe(z).
for t = 1, · · · , T do
Let (•(t), e(t))←ME(s, q, ǫ′) (The Exponential Mechanism)
Approximate best-response for the dual player λ(t):
if •(t) = + then λ(t)
e(t)
← −2m
else λ
(t)
e(t)
← +2m
for e′ ∈ E \ {e(t)} do λ(t)e′ = 0
Gradient descent update on the primal:
Take a step to improve the individual flow variables x(t):
x(t+1) ← GD(F(s),L(·,y(t) , λ(t)),x(t), ηx)
Take a step to improve the congestion variables y(t):
y(t+1) ← GD([0, n]m,L(x(t), ·, λ(t)),y(t), ηy)
Let z(t+1) = (x(t+1),y(t+1)) be the new action for the primal player.
x = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t and λ = 1T
∑T
t=1 λ
(t)
for each player i do round the fractional flow: x•i ← PSRR(xi)
return x• = (x•i )i∈[n]
end procedure
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Note that initially, each player i simply sets x
(1)
i to be a feasible flow in the set FR(si), which
only depends on i’s private data.
Then at each round t, the algorithm updates the vector x(t) using the gradient:
∇xL(x,y(t), λ(t)) =
((
−λ(t)e
)
e∈E
)
i∈[n]
.
The gradient descent update for x(t) is
x(t+1) = ΠFR(s)
[
x(t) − ηx(λ(t))i∈[n]
]
= arg min
x∈FR(s)
∥∥∥x− (x(t) − ηx(λ(t))i∈[n])∥∥∥2
2
= arg min
x∈FR(s)
∑
i∈[n]
(∑
e∈E
∥∥∥xi,e − (x(t)i,e − ηxλ(t)e )∥∥∥2
2
)
Note that this update step can be decomposed into n individual updates over the players:
x
(t+1)
i = arg min
x∈FR(si)
∑
e∈E
∥∥∥xi,e − (x(t)i,e − ηxλ(t)e )∥∥∥2
2
Since such an update only depends on the private data of i and also the sequence of dual plays
{λ(t)}, we know that {x(t)} satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy by the Billboard Lemma.
Finally, the output integral solution xi to each player i is simply a sample from the distribution
induced by the average play of i: x. Therefore, we can conclude that releasing xi to each player i
satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy.
4.3 Utility of the JDP Gradient Descent Algorithm
We now establish the accuracy guarantee of the integral flow x• computed by the procedure P-GD.
First, consider the average of the actions taken by both players over the T rounds of the algorithm
P-GD: z = 1T
∑T
t=1 z
(t) and λ = 1T
∑T
t=1 λ
(t). Recall that the minimax value of the Lagrangian game
is defined as
max
λ∈Rm
min
(x,y)∈GR(s)
L(x,y, λ) = min
(x,y)∈GR(s)
max
λ∈Rm
L(x,y, λ) = OPTR(s). (16)
Thus, in order to show that z is a flow with nearly optimal cost (i.e. cost not much larger than
OPTR(s)), it suffices to show that (z, λ) are a pair of “approximate minimax strategies”. That is,
each player is guaranteeing itself a payoff that is close to the value of the game. Formally, (z, λ) is
a pair of R-approximate minimax strategies if
∀z′, L(z, λ) ≤ L(z′, λ) +R and ∀λ′, L(z, λ) ≥ L(z, λ′)−R.
Looking ahead, using the properties of gradient descent, we can show that (z, λ) are a pair of
R-approximate minimax strategies for a bound R that will grow with the norm of the dual player’s
actions, i.e. ‖λ(t)‖2. Thus, in P-GD, the dual player’s action is chosen to have bounded norm (at
most 2m), in order to ensure R is relatively small. However, from (16) it’s not clear that the
optimal dual strategy has small norm, so restricting the norm of the dual player’s actions might
22
change the value of the game. However, we show that restricting the norm of the dual player’s
action does not change the value of the game.
Let (z∗, λ∗) be a pair of (exact) minimax strategies in the Lagrangian game. By strong duality,
we know that
L(z∗, λ∗) = OPTR(s)
and z∗ is an optimal and feasible solution. We now reason about the restricted Lagrangian game,
in which the dual player’s action is restricted to the space B = {λ ∈ Rm | ‖λ‖1 ≤ 2m} ⊆ Rm.
The next lemma states that even when the dual player’s actions are restricted, then z∗ is still a
minimax strategy for the primal player. That is, the primal player cannot take advantage of the
restriction on the dual player to obtain a higher payoff.
Lemma 4.3. There exists a dual strategy λ∗B ∈ B such that (z∗, λ∗B) is a pair of (exact) minimax
strategies for the restricted Lagrangian game.
Proof. Since z∗ is an (exact) minimax strategy for the (unrestricted) Lagrangian game, we know
that for any λ ∈ B
L(z∗, λ) = c(y∗) = OPTR(s).
Let x′ ∈ FR(s) and y ∈ [0, n]m be different flows such that x′ 6= x∗ and y′ 6= y∗. We want to
show that
max
λ∈B
L(x,y, λ) ≥ max
λ∈B
L(z∗, λ) := L(z∗, λ∗B).
If we have y′e =
∑n
i=1 x
′
i,e for all e ∈ E, then
max
λ∈B
L(x,y, λ) = c(y) ≥ c(y∗).
Suppose there is some edge such that y′e 6=
∑n
i=1 x
′
i,e, then we define ∆ := ‖y′ −
∑n
i=1 x
′
i‖∞.
With the cost function in terms of the individual flow variables in (4) we know that
c(y) ≥ φ(x) − 1
n
∑
e∈E
∆ · ℓe(n) ≥ φ(x)−m ·∆ ≥ c(y∗)−m ·∆.
Note that the dual player can set λe = 2m for
∑n
i=1 x
′
ie−y′e > 0 or λe = −2m for
∑n
i=1 x
′
ie−y′e <
0 for the maximally violated edge e:
max
λ∈B
L(x,y, λ) = c(y) + 2m ·∆ ≥ c(y∗) + ·∆(2m−m) > OPTR(s).
Therefore, any infeasible (x,y) would suffer loss at least OPTR(s) in the worst case over the dual
strategy space. It follows that (z∗, λ∗) is a minimax strategy.
Since both players’ action spaces GR(s) and B are compact, then there exists a minimax strategy
(z∗, λ∗B) of the restricted Lagrangian game.
Using the previous lemma, we know that the value of the restricted game is the same
Lemma 4.4. Let (z, λ) be a pair of R-approximate minimax strategy of the restricted Lagrangian
game, and z = (x,y). Then the fractional solution x satisfies
φ(x) ≤ OPTR(s) + 4R.
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Proof. We will first bound the constraint violation in (x,y). Let e′ ∈ argmaxe∈E |
∑
i xi,e − ye| be
an edge where the constraint is violated the most, and let ∆ = |∑i xi,e′ − ye′|. Consider the dual
strategy λ′ ∈ B such that
λ′e′ =
{
−2m if ∑i xi,e′ − ye′ ≥ 0
2m otherwise
and λ′e = 0 for all e 6= e′. Now compare the payoff values L(x,y, λ) and L(x,y, λ′). By the property
of R-approximate equilibrium and letting ((x∗,y∗), λ∗) be the exact equilibrium, we have
OPTR(s)−R = L(x∗,y∗, λ∗)−R ≤ L(x,y, λ∗)−R
≤ L(x,y, λ) ≤ L(x∗,y∗, λ) +R ≤ OPTR(s) +R
=⇒ OPTR(s)−R ≤ L(x,y, λ) ≤ OPTR(s) +R
and
L(x,y, λ′) ≤ OPTR(s) + 2R.
Since (x,y) violates equality constraint on each edge by at most ∆, we know that
c(y) ≥ φ(x)− 1
n
·
∑
e∈E
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
xi,e − ye
∣∣∣∣∣ · ℓe(n) ≥ OPTR(s)−m∆.
Also, the penalty incurred by λ′ is at least
∑
e∈E
λ′e
(
ye −
∑
i
xi,e
)
= 2m ·∆.
Therefore, we could bound
L(x,y, λ′) ≥ OPTR(s) +m ·∆.
It follows that ∆ ≤ 2R/m.
Next we will show the accuracy guarantee of x. Consider an all-zero strategy for the dual player
λ′′, that is λ′′e = 0 for each e ∈ E. We know such a deviation will not increase the payoff by more
than R:
L(x,y, λ′′) ≤ L(x,y, λ) +R ≤ OPTR(s) + 2R,
and also L(x,y, λ′′) = c(y), so we must have
c(y) ≤ OPTR(s) + 2R.
Now we could give the accuracy guarantee for the cost of the individual flows x:
φ(x) ≤ c(y) + 1
n
∑
e∈E
∆ · ℓe(n) ≤ OPTR(s) + 2R+ 2(R/m) ·m = OPTR(s) + 4R.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
The previous discussion shows that if (z, λ) is a pair of approximate minimax strategies for the
restricted Lagrangian game, then x represents an approximately optimal flow. In the remainder of
this section, we show that (z, λ) will be such a pair of strategies. To do so, we use a well known
result of Freund and Schapire Freund and Schapire (1996), which states that if z and λ have “low
regret,” then they are a pair of approximate minimax strategies. “Regret” is defined as follows.
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Definition 4.5. Given a sequence of of actions {z(t)} and {λ(t)} in the Lagrangian game, we define
regret for each player as:
Rz ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
L(z(t), λ(t))− min
z∈G(s)
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(z, λ(t))
Rλ ≡ max
λ∈B
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(z(t), λ)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
L(z(t), λ(t))
Given this definition, the result of Freund and Schapire (1996) can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.6 (Freund and Schapire (1996)). If (z, λ) is the average of the primal and dual players’
actions in P-GD, then (z, λ) is a pair of (Rz+Rλ)-approximate minimax strategies of the restricted
Lagrangian game.
Given the previous theorem, our goal is now roughly to show that z and λ have low regret. To
do so, we need to analyze the regret properties of the gradient descent procedure, as well as the
additional regret incurred by the noise added to ensure joint differential privacy.
Specifically, the gradient descent procedure GD satisfies the following regret bound.
Lemma 4.7 (Zinkevich (2003)). Fix the number of steps T ∈ N. Let Dˆ be a convex and closed set
with bounded diameter, i.e. for every ω, ω′ ∈ D,
||ω − ω′||2 ≤ D.
Let r1, . . . , rT be a sequence of differentiable, convex functions with bounded gradients, i.e. for every
step t ∈ [T ],
||∇rt||2 ≤ G.
Let η = D
G
√
T
and ω0 ∈ D be arbitrary. Then if we compute ω1, . . . , ωT ∈ D according to the rule
ωt+1 ← GD(D, rt, ωt, ηt), the sequence {ω1, . . . , ωT } satisfies
RT (GD) :=
T∑
t=1
rt(ωt)−min
ω∈D
{
T∑
t=1
rt(ω)
}
≤ GD
√
T (17)
We can now use this regret bound for GD to give a regret bound for the private gradient descent
procedure P-GD.
Lemma 4.8. Fix ε, δ, β > 0. If (z, λ) is the average of the primal and dual players’ actions in
P-GD(Γ, ε, δ, β), then with probability at least 1 − β, (z, λ) are a pair of R-approximate minimax
strategies in the restricted Lagrangian game, for
R = O˜
(√
nm5/4√
ε
)
Proof. In light of Theorem 4.6, we know R = Rz +Rλ, so we just need to bound the regrets for
both players. For the flow player z, we will bound the regrets of x and y separately by invoking
the regret bound of Zinkevich (2003) given in Lemma 4.7.
We define Gy such that ∀t ∈ [T ] we have ||∇yL(z, λ(t))||2 ≤ Gy and Dy such that ∀y,y′ ∈ [0, n]m
we have ||y−y′||2 ≤ Dy. We define corresponding quantities for Gx and Dx. It suffices to set these
values in the following way:
Gy :=
√
(m− 1)(γ + 1)2 + (γ + 1 + 2m)2 Dy := n
√
m
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Gx := 2m
√
n Dx :=
√
mn
Using (17) we have the following bound on the regret .
Rz ≤ 1/
√
T (Gy ·Dy +Gx ·Dx)
≤ n
√
m√
T
·
(√
m(γ + 1)2 + (γ + 1 + 2m)2 + 2m
)
= O
(
nm3/2√
T
)
(18)
with the following step sizes:
ηx :=
Dx
Gx
√
T
ηy :=
Dy
Gy
√
T
(19)
Now we bound the regret for the dual player. Note that each agent could only affect the quality
score q of each edge by 1. By the utility guarantee of the exponential mechanism stated in Lemma
A.6 we know that with probability at least 1− β/T , at round t
max
(•,e)∈{±}×E
∣∣∣q(z(t), (•, e)) − q(z(t), (•(t), e(t))∣∣∣ ≤ 2(log(2mT/β))
ε′
(20)
We condition on this level of accuracy for each round t, which holds except with probability β.
Also, at each round t, a best response for the dual player is to put weight ±2m on the edge
with the most violation, so we can bound the regret:
Rλ = 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
max
λ∈B
L(z(t), λ)− L(z(t), λ(t))
]
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
2m · 2(log(2mT/β))
ε′
= 2m · 2(log(2mT/β))
ε′
For T = Θ
(
εn
√
m
log(mn/β)
√
log(1/δ)
)
, we know that
R = Rz +Rλ = O
(
nm3/2√
T
+
m log(mT/β)
√
T log(1/δ)
ǫ
)
= O
(√
nm5/4√
ε
· polylog(1/δ, 1/β, n,m)
)
The previous lemma shows that the fractional solution has nearly optimal cost. The last thing
we need to do is derive a bound on how much the rounding procedure PSRR increases the cost of
the final integral solution.
Lemma 4.9. Let x be any feasible fractional solution to the convex program (12), and let x• be an
integral solution obtained by the rounding procedure PSRR(x). Then, with probability at least 1− β,
φ(x•) ≤ φ(x) +m(γ + 1)
√
2n ln(m/β).
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Proof. From the analysis of Raghavan and Thompson (1987) (in Theorem 3.1 of the source), we
know that with probability at least 1− β,
max
e∈E
[∑
i
x•i,e −
∑
i
xi,e
]
<
√
2n ln(m/β) ≡W.
Finally, we could bound the difference between the costs φ(x•) and φ(x)
φ(x•)− φ(x) ≤ 1
n
·

∑
e
x•i,e ·

ℓe

∑
j
x•j,e

− ℓe

∑
j
xj,e



+∑
e
W · ℓe

∑
j
x•j,e




≤ 1
n
· (mnγW +mnW ) = mW (γ + 1).
This completes the proof.
Combining Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.9 we obtain our desired bound on the quality of the joint
differentially private integral solution.
Theorem 4.10. Let Γ = (G, ℓ, s) be a routing game and ε, δ, β > 0 be parameters. If x• is the final
integral solution given by P-GD(Γ, ε, δ, β), then with probability at least 1−β, the cost of x• satisfies
φ(x•) ≤ OPT(s) + O˜
(√
nm5/4√
ε
+m
√
n
)
i.e. x• is an α-approximate optimal flow for α = O˜
(√
nm5/4√
ε
)
.
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A Tools for Differential Privacy
In this section we review the necessary privacy definitions and tools needed for our results. Through-
out, let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Sn be a database consisting of n elements from a domain S. In keeping
with our game theoretic applications, we refer to the elements s1, . . . , sn as types and each type
belongs to a player i ∈ [n].
We first state a general lemmas about differential privacy.
Lemma A.1 (Post-Processing Dwork et al. (2006)). Given a mechanism M : Sn → O and some
(possibly randomized) function p : O → O′ that is independent of the players’ types s ∈ Sn, ifM(s)
is (ε, δ)-differentially private then p(M(s)) is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
A.1 The Laplace Mechanism
We will use the Laplace Mechanism, which was introduced by Dwork et al Dwork et al. (2006) to
answers a vector-valued query f : Sn → Rk.
The Laplace Mechanism depends on the notation of sensitivity—how much a function can
change when a single entry in its input is altered.
Definition A.2 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity ∆f of a function f : Sn → Rk is defined as
∆f = max
i∈[n],(si,s−i)∈Sn,s′i∈S
{||f(si, s−i)− f(s′i, s−i)||1} .
Algorithm 7 Laplace Mechanism Dwork et al. (2006)
Input: : Database s ∈ Sn, query f : Sn → Rk, and privacy parameter ε.
procedure ML(s, f, ε)
Set aˆ = f(s) + Z Z = (Z1, · · · , Zk) and Zi ∼ Lap(∆f/ε)
return aˆ.
end procedure
Lemma A.3 (Dwork et al. (2006)). The Laplace Mechanism ML is ε-differentially private.
Lemma A.4 (Dwork et al. (2006)). The Laplace Mechanism ML(s, f, ε) produces output aˆ such
that with probability at least 1− β we have
||f(s)− aˆ||∞ ≤ log
(
k
β
)(
∆f
ε
)
A.2 The Exponential Mechanism
We now present an algorithm introduced by McSherry and Talwar (2007) that is differentially
private called the exponential mechanism. Let us assume that we have some finite outcome space
O and a quality score q : Sn ×O → R that tells us how good the outcome o ∈ O is with the given
database s ∈ Sn. We define the sensitivity of q as the maximum over o ∈ O of the sensitivity of
q(·; o). Specifically,
∆q = max
o ∈ O, s, s′ ∈ Sn
{|q(s, o) − q(s′, o)|} for neighboring s, s′
30
Algorithm 8 Exponential Mechanism McSherry and Talwar (2007)
Input: : Database s ∈ Sn, quality function q : Sn ×O → R, and privacy parameter ε.
procedure ME(s, q, ε)
Output o ∈ O with probability proportional to
exp
(
εq(s, o)
2∆q
)
end procedure
Lemma A.5 (McSherry and Talwar (2007)). The Exponential Mechanism ME is ε-differentially
private.
We then define the highest possible quality score with database d to beOPTq(s) = maxo∈O{q(s, o)}.
We then obtain the following proposition that tells us how close we are to the optimal quality score.
Lemma A.6 (McSherry and Talwar (2007)). We have the following utility guarantee from the
Exponential Mechanism ME: with probability at least 1− β and every t > 0,
q(s,ME(s, q, ε)) ≥ OPTq(s)− 2∆q
ε
(log |O|+ t)
A.3 Composition Theorems
Now that we have given a few differentially private algorithms, we want to show that differentially
private algorithms can compose “nicely” to get other differentially private algorithms. We will need
to use two composition theorems later in this paper. The first shows that the privacy parameters
add when we compose two differentially private mechanisms, and the second from Dwork et al.
(2010) gives a better composition guarantee when using many adaptively chosen mechanisms.
Lemma A.7. If we have one mechanism M1 : Sn → O that is (ε1, δ1)-differentially private, and
another mechanism M2 : Sn × O → R is (ε2, δ2)-differentially private in its first component, then
M : Sn → R is (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2) differentially private where
M(s) =M2(s,M1(s)).
If we were to only consider the previous composition theorem, then the composition of m
mechanisms that are ε-differentially private mechanisms would lead to a mε-differentially private
mechanism. However, the next theorem says that we can actually get (ε′, δ)-differential privacy
where ε′ = O(
√
mε) if we allow for a small δ > 0. This theorem also holds under the threat of an
adversary that uses an adaptively chosen sequence of differentially private mechanisms so that each
can use the outputs of the past mechanisms and different datasets that may or may not include an
individual’s data. See Dwork et al. (2010) for further details.
Lemma A.8 (m-Fold Adaptive Composition Dwork et al. (2010)). Fix δ > 0. The class of (ε′, δ′)
differentially private mechanisms satisfies (ε,mδ′ + δ) differential privacy under m-fold adaptive
composition for
ε′ =
ε√
8m log(1/δ)
.
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We also include a proof of Lemma 3.3, the composition of a differentially private algorithm with
another joint differentially private algorithm is differentially private.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let S ⊆ O, i ∈ [n], and consider data s ∈ Sn and s′ = (s′i, s−i) for s′i ∈ S.
We have
P [M(s) ∈ S] =
∫
Xn
P [MD(x) ∈ S] · P [MJ(s) = x] dx
=
∫
Xn−1
[∫
X
P [MD(xi,x−i) ∈ S] · P [MJ(s) = x] dxi
]
dx−i
We then use the fact that, since MD satisfies εD-differential privacy, we know that for any fixed
x′i ∈ X , it holds that P [MD(xi,x−i) ∈ S] ≤ min{eεD ·P [MD(x′i,x−i) ∈ S] , 1}. We let Px′i,x−i denote
the RHS of this inequality.
P [M(s) ∈ S] ≤
∫
Xn−1
[∫
X
Px′i,x−i · P [MJ(s) = x] dxi
]
dx−i
=
∫
Xn−1
Px′i,x−i · P [MJ(s)−i = x−i] dx−i
Now we use the fact that, since MJ satisfies (εJ , δ)-joint differential privacy, we have the inequality
P [MJ(s)−i = x−i] ≤ eεJ · P [MJ(s′)−i = x−i] + δ = (
∫
X e
εJ · P [MJ(s′) = x] dxi) + δ.
P [M(s) ∈ S] ≤
∫
Xn−1
Px′i,x−i ·
[∫
X
eεJ · P [MJ(s′) = x] dxi + δ] dx−i
≤ eεJ ·
∫
Xn−1
Px′i,x−i ·
[∫
X
P
[
MJ(s
′) = x
]
dxi
]
dx−i + δ ·
∫
Xn−1
Px′i,x−idx−i
Using our definition of Px′i,x−i (using the first term in the min for the first term above and the
second term of the min for the second term above) we can simplify as follows.
P [M(s) ∈ S] ≤ eεD+εJ ·
∫
Xn
P
[
MD(x
′
i,x−i) ∈ S
]
P
[
MJ(s
′) = x
]
dx+ δ
Again we can apply the fact that, since MD is εD-differentially private, for every xi ∈ X , we have
that P [MD(x
′
i,x−i) ∈ S] ≤ eεD · P [MD(x) ∈ S].
P [M(s) ∈ S] ≤ e2εD+εJ ·
∫
Xn
P [MD(x) ∈ S]P
[
MJ(s
′) = x
]
dx+ δ
= e2εD+εJ · P [M(s′) ∈ S]+ δ
Since this bound holds for every neighboring pair s, s′, we have proven the lemma.
B Bounding the Number of Unsatisfied Players
We seek to bound the number of players that are approximately unsatisfied w.r.t. congestion yˆ in
the approximately optimal flow x• under the routing game Γτˆ , where yˆ is the perturbed version
of congestion y• =
∑
i x
•
i . First, we give a way to bound the number of unsatisfied players for
any approximately optimal flow in the routing game Γτ
∗
= (G, ℓ + τ∗, s) that uses the functional
marginal-cost tolls τ∗(·) given in (6).
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Lemma B.1. Let ρ > 0 and x• be an α-approximately optimal flow in the routing game Γ. Then
the number of ζ1(ρ)-unsatisfied players in Γ
τ∗ with respect to congestion y• =
∑n
i=1 x
•
i is bounded
by nα/ρ where
ζ1(ρ) = ρ+ 4mnγα/ρ
Proof. Let x be any flow in F(s). Consider the following ρ-best response dynamics: while there
exists some ρ-unsatisfied agent i (w.r.t. the true congestion
∑
i xi), let i make a deviation that
decreases her cost the most. Recall that we write OPT(s) as the optimal value for the routing
game Γ. Note that in the tolled routing game Γτ
∗
, the potential function Ψ given in (7) satisfies
Ψ(x) = n · φ(x).
Note that x• is an α-approximately optimal flow, so
OPT(s) ≤ 1
n
·Ψ(x•) ≤ OPT(s) + α.
Since each deviation a player made in the dynamics decreases the potential function Ψ(x) by
at least ρ, ρ-best response dynamics in game Γτ
∗
starting with flow x• will terminate after at most
nα/ρ iterations. The resulting flow xˆ has all agents ρ-satisfied. In the process, the congestion of
each edge might have increased or decreased by at most nα/ρ. For each edge e ∈ E, the change in
latency is bounded using our γ-Lipschitz condition
|ℓe(ye)− ℓe(y′e)| ≤ nγα/ρ.
Furthermore, the edge toll is also γ-Lipschitz
|τ∗e (ye)− τ∗e (y′e)| = |(ye − 1)(ℓe(ye)− ℓ(ye − 1)) − (y′e − 1)(ℓe(y′e)− ℓ(y′e − 1))|
≤ γ|(ye − 1)− (y′e − 1)| ≤ nγα/ρ.
For the agents that did not deviate in the dynamics, their cost is changed by at most 2mnγα/ρ.
Since they are ρ-satisfied at the end of the dynamics, this means they were (ρ+4mγnα/ρ)-satisfied
in the beginning of the process.4 Since the ρ-best response dynamics lasts for nα/ρ rounds, there
are at most nα/ρ number of agents that deviate in the dynamics.
Based on Lemma B.1, we can now bound the number of approximately unsatisfied players when
we impose constant tolls τ ′ = τ∗(y•) instead of functional tolls on the edges.
Lemma B.2. Let ρ > 0, x• be an α-approximately optimal flow in the routing game Γ, and
τ ′ = τ∗(
∑
i x
•
i ) be the vector of constant tolls. Then, the number of ζ2(ρ)-unsatisfied players with
respect to y• =
∑
i x
•
i in the routing game Γ
τ ′ is bounded by nα/ρ, where
ζ2(ρ) = ρ+ 4mγnα/ρ+ 2mγ.
Proof. Let player i be a ζ1(ρ)-satisfied player in flow x
• under the routing game Γτ
∗
. Now we argue
that he should also be ζ2(ρ)-satisfied under the game Γ
τ ′ . Suppose not. Then there exists a route
x′i for player i that can decrease the cost by more than ζ2(ρ) under Γ
τ ′ . Now consider the same
deviation in game Γτ
∗
. Since the functional toll on each edge can change by at most γ, we know
that player i’s costs in Γτ
∗
and Γτ
′
differ by at most 2mγ. This implies that the deviation x′i in
game Γτ
∗
could gain him more than ζ1(ρ) since ζ2(ρ)− ζ1(ρ) = 2mγ.
4While the same path agent i is taking might have cost lowered by 2mγnα/ρ in the dynamics, any alternate
(si, ti)-path might have increased its cost by 2mγnα/ρ.
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From Lemma B.1, we know that the number of ζ1(ρ)-unsatisfied players under the routing game
Γτ
∗
is bounded by nα/ρ. Therefore, we know that the number of ζ2(ρ)-unsatisfied players under
Γτ
′
is also bounded by nα/ρ.
Combining the previous two lemmas, we could now bound the number of unsatisfied players in
Γτˆ with respect to y =
∑n
i=1 xi with the differentially private constant tolls τˆ .
Lemma B.3. Let ρ, ε > 0 and x• be an α-approximately optimal flow in the routing game Γ. Let
τˆ = τ∗(yˆ) where yˆ = P-CON(x•, ε). Then with probability at least 1 − β, the number of ζε(ρ)-
unsatisfied players in Γτˆ with respect to y• =
∑n
i=1 x
•
i is bounded by α/ρ, where
ζε(ρ) = ζ2(ρ) + 4γm
2 log(m/β)/ε. (21)
Proof. From standard bounds on the tails of the Laplace distribution (Lemma A.4), we have the
following except with probability β:
max
e
∣∣∣∣∣yˆe −∑
i
x•i,e
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2mε · log
(
m
β
)
We now condition on this level of accuracy. Since the toll function τ∗(·) is γ-Lipschitz and τ ′ =
τ∗(y•), we have
max
e
∣∣τˆe − τ ′e∣∣ ≤ 2mγε · log
(
m
β
)
≡ νε
Therefore a player’s cost for taking the same route may increase by as much asmνε. Further, the
cost for an alternative route may decrease by at most the same amount. Thus, each of ζ2(ρ)-satisfied
players under the flow x• in Γτ
∗
remain (ζ2(ρ) + 2mνε)-satisfied in game Γ
τˆ . By Lemma B.2, we
know that the number of ζ2(ρ)-unsatisfied players in Γ
τ ′ is bounded by nα/ρ, so the number of
(ζ2(ρ) + 2mνε)-unsatisfied players in Γ
τˆ is bounded by nα/ρ as well.
We now consider what happens when instead of allowing players to best respond given the exact
congestion y =
∑n
i=1 xi, we instead let them best respond given a private and perturbed version
of the congestion. The following general lemma will be useful, which relates to unsatisfied players
in two different congestions that are close.
Lemma B.4. Let Γ be a routing game, and x be a flow in Γ. Let y and y′ such that ‖y−y′‖∞ ≤ b.
Then for any number ζ > 0, the set of ζ-satisfied players in x with respect to y are also ζ ′-satisfied
with respect to y′, where
ζ ′ = ζ + 2mγb.
Proof. The proof follows from the same analysis in the proof of Lemma B.3
From the analysis of Lemma B.3, we know that ‖yˆ− y•‖∞ ≤ 2mε · log
(
m
β
)
, so by instantiating
Lemma B.3 with ρ = 2
√
mγnα and combining with the result of Lemma B.4, we recover the bound
in Lemma 3.6, that is the number of ζˆε-unsatisfied players w.r.t. congestion yˆ in x
• and game Γτˆ
is bounded by
√
nα/4mγ with
ζˆε = 4
√
mγnα+ 8γm2 log(m/β)/ε.
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